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MAJOR INTERESTS AND STRATEGIES FOR THE BLACK SEA REGION 
 
Framework Analytical Review  
 
 
 
 
 
There are three groups of basic interests, represented in the Black Sea region of today. 
First, we have the interests of the West, divided quite explicitly between the US and the 
positions of the major continental European countries. Both Washington and the EU powers 
pursue strategies for change and transformation of the region around the Black Sea, motivated 
by different – only partially coinciding - policy agendas. Second, the interests of post-Soviet 
Russia and Turkey, getting closer and closer together in a block of the status quo powers in 
the Black Sea region. Third, we observe the interests of the smaller Black Sea countries 
(Ukraine included, even if its size does not correspond to the definition of a “small country”). 
Those smaller countries are quite diverse and challenged by different policy agendas. Bulgaria 
and Romania are NATO members and EU hopefuls for January 1, 2007. Ukraine, Georgia 
and Moldova struggle – each country within its own environment – for independence from 
Russian neo-imperial grip, for national integration and successful reform and modernization. 
Armenia is following its own strategic agenda, dominated by the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict 
with Azerbaijan and the effective blockade, imposed by Turkey on the grounds of several 
disputed bilateral problems, Karabakh included. Azerbaijan – last but not least - is distantly 
present in the Black Sea environment, both with intensifying transfer of Azeri oil across the 
Caucasus and the Black Sea (the BTC pipeline), and with its integral presence into the South 
Caucasus strategic balance and in the broader post-Soviet context.1 
 
 
I. WESTERN INTERESTS IN THE BLACK SEA REGION   
 
The Black Sea was a Cold War frontier, reproducing a legacy of intense imperial 
contest between Russia and Ottoman Turkey for five centuries, with a short interwar break 
before the establishment of a bipolar world in the late 1940s. After 1989, the region has fallen 
into the eastern tier of the buffer zone between post-Soviet Russia and the victorious Western 
Alliance. The complex transformation of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) throughout the 
1990s - the post-Yugoslav crisis included - has occupied the attention and the resources of the 
West, ranking the Black Sea problems as a remote priority in the Western strategic agenda. At 
the same time, for a number of important reasons, the Western policy planners and decision- 
makers have always kept an eye on the developments in and around the Black Sea. The region 
has always been a potential priority for the West, waiting for its time to come. After the last 
round of NATO enlargement – the “Big Bang” of the Vilnius group accession – the agenda of 
post-Soviet Black Sea transformation has gradually penetrated the policy agenda of both 
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Europe and the US. However, the strategic interests of both major players of the West should 
be defined separately, even if they’re partially interrelated.2 
 
 
1. The US strategic perspective towards the Black Sea region 
 
For the US the Black Sea is a strategic corridor, serving three basic and interrelated 
strategic causes. First, the Black Sea connects Europe with Central Asia through the 
Caucasus, with Central Asia being the focus, the seat of the geo-strategic balance between 
China and the West for the 21st century. The level of influence and control, which the only 
present superpower could exercise on Central Asia, will determine to a large extent the 
preconditions for the upcoming global contest between Washington and Beijing. The level of 
Western control over Central Asia plays also a key role in structuring Russia’s strategic 
choices between China and the West. Second, the Black Sea represents a gateway to the 
larger Middle East. The opportunity to shape and control the agenda of the Black Sea and the 
Caucasus provides the US with the potential to fully integrate both regional powers – Russia 
and Turkey – into the Western Alliance. A failure of Washington to dominate the Black Sea 
agenda, on the other hand, provides Moscow and Ankara with powerful resources for 
autonomous strategic games and domination of the region.3 Third, the Black Sea is an 
important commercial route and energy corridor, which could provide Europe with alternative 
oil and gas resources, reducing the Old Continent’s energy dependence on the Middle East 
and Russia, thus serving as a strategic balancing resource against cartelization of energy 
provision. .  
 
The basic aim of the US strategy towards the Black Sea region is to anchor the post-
communist, in particular – post-Soviet societies  - into the Euro-Atlantic security space, to 
support democratic and market reforms in those countries, and to advocate their fast track 
integration into the EU. In achieving those goals, Washington is allied primarily with the 
reformist democratic elites of the post-communist, post-Soviet societies. The key opponents 
of the US strategy are the national branches of the old Soviet nomenklatura and the KGB, 
restructured as corrupt criminal national elites of the nominally “new independent states”. 
Russia, with its revived imperial instincts is the key supporter of those criminalized elites, and 
– therefore – the key rival to the US strategy in the region. In order to promote a sufficient 
success of its Black Sea regional strategy, the US government badly needs to achieve 
particular results to ensure the irreversibility of the reform process in countries like Ukraine, 
Georgia, and Moldova.4 The impediments to this major task are both internal – affecting the 
countries in transition realities, and external – related to the global strategic agenda of the 
sole superpower.  
 
The internal impediments to the US strategy are manifested mostly in the structural 
weakness of the reformist movements in the Black Sea post-Soviet societies. The US and the 
West in general have accumulated particular experience with heavy and controversial 
transformation of the Balkans in the 1990s, where at least Bulgaria and Romania proved – at 
the end of the day – to be relatively successful cases of societal reform and Euro-Atlantic 
integration. The cases of Ukraine and the South Caucasus, though, are much more 
complicated and resistant to change. A societal tradition of full dependence on Russian tsarist 
and – later on – Bolshevik model, no legacy of Western style modernization, let alone – 
democratization, strong culture of kinship and patriarchal syncretism – those are only the first 
key factors of structural weakness of modernizing elites, urban strata and professional middle 
class in those societies. Russian domination – direct and obscured – on national economies, 
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security systems and intellectual–cultural fields (in particular – in Ukraine) is efficiently 
enforced. If national potential for change is more or less successfully mobilized – as in the 
case of Georgia - a scenario of regulated ethnic conflicts is put into action. We have series of 
“frozen” and “melting” conflicts throughout the post-Soviet space, indicating systematic 
efforts of Russia to jeopardize successful nation-building on modern democratic basis – 
Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transdniestria. Nagorno Karabakh – which has more specific and 
autonomous root causes in Armenian – Azeri relationships, is used by Russia to maintain 
control over the South Caucasus too.  
 
Fragile and inexperienced reformist elites tend to produce hectic political coalitions, 
easy to block while in government, overburdened by inter-personal animosities and discords. 
The latest developments in Ukraine, where four months of post-electoral deadlock ended up 
with victorious return of the pro-Russian, oligarchy-based Party of Regions in government, is 
a key case to the point.  
 
The external obstacles to the US strategy for Euro-Atlantic integration of the Black 
Sea region have three basic dimensions. First come the realities, related to the post-
September 11 strategic environment. The Black Sea strategy of the US was a consecutive part 
of a broader process of expanding the Euro-Atlantic strategic space, which gained momentum 
with the collapse of the Soviet dominated communist rule. Societies of Central and Eastern 
Europe, liberated from Soviet oppression have enthusiastically chosen the European 
integration model of development and the Euro-Atlantic system of security guarantees. More 
than that – the newly established democratic governments intensely lobbied Washington and 
the European capitals for faster accession into the international system and the organizations 
of the West. The democratic choice of these European post-communist countries completely 
coincided with the strategic agenda of the US to extend the frontiers of Euro-Atlantic space to 
the east, closer to the division lines with the world of Islam and China. Between 1998-2002 
all ex-Soviet satellites in Europe, the three Baltic ex-Soviet republics included, joined NATO. 
The Alliance has hit the frontiers of post-Soviet space, the Black Sea in particular. The next 
step of successful development of Western strategy for integration should have been Ukraine, 
plus Georgia and most of the South Caucasus – anchored and included into the Euro-Atlantic 
mainstream. There came September 11. 
 
The war on terror reshaped fundamentally the global strategic outlook of the US. From 
a strategic doctrine of multi-priority, globally balanced influence and control over the key 
trends of global development, the US government moved to one-dimensional, single-focus 
strategy of chasing and destroying the diversified net of radical Islamist cells around the 
world, aimed at preventing their ability to organize and hit targets on US territory. The war in 
Iraq – strange enough endeavor, even from the narrow perspective of the war on terror, 
additionally narrowed the strategic approach of the world sole superpower to global realities 
and to global challenges. One particular consequence of this state of affairs has been the 
relative delay and weakening of the Washington’s Black Sea strategy. .  
 
The second external obstacle to efficient development of the US Black Sea strategy is 
closely related to the first. Having sensed the relative weakening of American power in the 
region, Russia – and to a lesser extent Turkey - have regained strategic initiative in the region. 
The detailed analysis of both regional powers’ strategies follows in the next chapter, yet it is 
important to mention several key phenomena, stemming out from the changing strategic 
balance in the region. Controversial developments in Ukraine and the concentrated efforts of 
the Kremlin to successfully jeopardize a governmental option of the Orange coalition after the 
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March elections was the first example: the Socialist leader A. Moroz and a number of his 
MP’s defection from the Orange coalition was not incidental. The stagnation of “frozen 
conflicts” status quo in Georgia for the last 2-3 years is a second example to the case.5 
Moscow has also decisively taken advantage of the discord between Washington and key 
Central Asian regimes – namely Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan - in order to push out or 
marginalize American military presence and political influence in the region. The principle 
rejection of Washington of the Andijon massacre has fully convinced Uzbek president 
Karimov that Moscow is much better friend to authoritarian leaders rather than the West and 
Washington in particular.6  
 
The third external impediment to the US Black Sea strategy is the strategic discord 
between Washington and the major countries of continental Europe – the strategic departure 
between both sides of the Atlantic intensified particularly after 2002 in the context of the Iraq 
war dispute.7 At present we could hardly talk about any substantive compatibility between the 
policies of the US and the EU towards the Black Sea post-Soviet space. The discord is along 
the following lines. First - the attitudes towards Russia. While Washington perceives Moscow 
as an opponent, if not a rival in the key issues of Black Sea democratization and reformation 
agenda, Berlin and Paris share the understanding of Russia’s legitimate right to keep its own 
sphere of influence around its borders in order to balance the extension of the Atlantic 
Alliance to the east. Based on that presumption, the major European capitals maintain 
cautious attitude towards the Georgian efforts of to transform its positions from a Russian 
satellite to a Western ally, from a backward dominion of Moscow, to a reformed partner of 
the West. The same European leaders were not very happy either to watch the Orange 
revolution in Kiev, which attempted to transform Ukraine from an amorphous buffer zone 
between Russia and Europe to a reformist applicant for NATO and EU membership.8 
 
The second line of US – European discord in the Black Sea relates directly to the EU 
enlargement dilemma. The faster the EU enlargement to the east – the better - is the position 
of Washington. The EU enlargement adds economic and social stability to the regions, 
integrated into the Euro-Atlantic security space through the NATO enlargement. This has 
been the model of interdependence between NATO and EU membership for the ex-
communist countries in CEE – NATO membership opened the door for EU accession. This 
model of interdependence does not work anymore. There is an open rebellion in Brussels – a 
refusal to follow the path of further enlargement commitments after the “Big Bang” of ten 
new members in 2004, plus Bulgaria and Romania waiting for January 1, 2007, plus Croatia 
knocking on the door for 2009, and Turkey further in the line. The politically correct 
definition for this rebellion is “enlargement fatigue”. Yet, there’s a silently shared consensus 
among many European leaders and citizens that the US pursues a hidden agenda of 
jeopardizing European unity and political integration through speedy enlargement, in order to 
prevent Europe from becoming a major international competitor to American might. 
Whatever the arguments behind “enlargement fatigue”, one thing is for sure – at least in the 
next decade, no further EU enlargement process in the Black Sea post-Soviet space is going to 
take place. If Europe is to assist the Black Sea strategy of the US, the accession into the EU 
will not be the instrument. 
 
Summing up the external impediments to the Black Sea strategy of Washington in 
midterm perspective, we face a relatively unfavorable framework for successful 
transformation of the region from the perspective of the long term US interest. The Black Sea 
is sucked into the global maelstrom of a worsening environment for the US strategic interests. 
The geopolitical revival of Russia, based on rising energy prices, the growing influence of 
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Iran, based on the removal of Iraq’s balancing role in the Middle East, the growing danger of 
an open civil war in Iraq, Turkey’s growing discontent with the US and the clear attempts of 
Ankara to play its own role in the region, based on flexible alliances with US adversaries – all 
those factors coincide and interrelate into an environment of weakening America’s strategic 
potential to influence the transformation and Euro-Atlantic integration of the Black Sea 
region. Instead of a region, integrated into the Western mainstream, a region of serious 
division lines and potential fault lines is shaping up. If the US does not succeed in reversing 
this trend, the general strategy of opening secure corridors to Central Asia and the larger 
Middle East in order to favorably face the geo-strategic contests of the 21st century may 
generally be doomed to failure. 
 
 
2. United Europe and the Black Sea 
 
To speak about a comprehensive EU strategy towards the Black Sea is more 
appropriate in future, rather than in past or present tense.9 The European presence in Ukraine 
or the South Caucasus after 1991 is measured mostly by the activities of organizations like the 
OSCE, the Council of Europe and by programs for developmental assistance of the EU like 
TACIS. There was little, if any practical cooperation between Brussels and the BSEC – the 
only multilateral institution of economic and political partnership around the Black Sea. Being 
overwhelmed by its internal institutional evolution after Maastricht, by the priority of 
assisting the reform processes in CEE, and in particular with the post-conflict settlement of 
the Western Balkans, the EU could allocate few if any resources to the Black Sea reform and 
transformation process. Some major European countries have been quite active in trying to 
mediate in particular conflicts of the post-Soviet Black Sea space, yet their approach has been 
quite cautious not to anger the former imperial master and present superpower of the region – 
Russia. 
 
The Black Sea appeared on the Brussels radar screen with the accession of the CEE 
countries into the EU in 2004, and – even more so – with the expected accession of Bulgaria 
and Romania, both littoral countries in the Black Sea basin. The Turkish membership 
negotiations, even if presuming membership at best within a 10-15 years period, are also 
motivating the strategic planners of Brussels to consider the agenda of the region as part of 
the immediate neighborhood of the EU. The interest towards the Black Sea among the EU 
members is uneven. Poland, the Baltic republics and Slovakia are acting very intensely in 
favor of reform processes in Ukraine, in assisting the democratic governments around the 
Black Sea to resist Russian pressure and successfully fulfill their nation-building and 
democratization agenda. The support for the GUAM countries, the involvement of new CEE 
members of the EU into initiatives like the CDC (Commonwealth for Democratic Choice),  
the Black Sea Forum (organized by Romania), the group of six countries “Friends of 
Georgia”, established in 2004 – those are only the most essential examples of CEE EU 
members assistance to the transformation of the ex-Soviet Black Sea countries.  
 
The interests of larger EU countries in the Black Sea are mostly structured through 
their relationships with Russia. The fundamentally positive attitudes of Paris and Berlin 
towards Russia make them cautious in intervening in issues and effects of Russian arbitrary 
policies towards the fragile and helpless ex-Soviet republics – the ethnic conflicts, territorial 
separatism efforts and criminal puppet regimes, established or sustained by Moscow. The 
danger of being involved deeper into the labyrinth of irresoluble conflicts, tribal contests and 
hectic geopolitical environment of regions like the South Caucasus, prevents major European 
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capitals from adopting clear and efficient political standing on the regional agenda. There’s 
also another reason for Brussels to be cautious – the EU pattern of resolving problems is 
through stabilization – association, integration and accession. Throughout the period after 
1990, the US, together with all newly established democratic governments of CEE have 
strongly advocated enlargement of the EU to the east as fast as possible. So far, the strongest 
weapon of successful European intervention has been integration and further accession. The 
problems of “absorption capacity” that the EU encounters after the “Big Bang” of 2004-2007 
makes it hardly possible, if not suicidal to seriously consider the Black Sea post-Soviet 
countries in an agenda of potential further enlargement in the observable future. The EU had 
to invent the policy of the New Neighborhood.10 
 
The ENP is a concept, designed to provide the answer to a basic strategic dilemma of 
the EU. On the one hand, the EU has exhausted its capacity to interrelate and cooperate with 
its neighbors on the basis of the enlargement presumption – in which a successful cooperation 
process with a country leads to accession.11 No further enlargement in the observable future is 
possible – neither from institutional capacity perspective (after the adoption of the EU 
Constitution failed at the French and Dutch referenda of 2005), nor from the point of view of 
public opinion in Europe. On the other hand, Europe has to seriously consider its interest and 
obligation to influence and support the reformist and democratic nation-building processes in 
its eastern periphery, the Black Sea included. It’s hardly possible for Brussels – or for the 
member states, to ignore dictatorial rule in Belarus, to tolerate Transdniestrian neo-communist 
junta in Tiraspol, to stand the influences of a neighborhood with a network of criminal 
gangster type puppet governments in fragmented and conflicting zones like the Caucasus, the 
Western Balkans and others. Neither is it in Europe’s interest to neglect the collapse of 
modern reformist elites in neighboring Islamic societies in favor of religious radicalism and 
fundamentalism. It is important for Europe to sustain and extend its potential to influence 
democratic reform, modern economic and institutional development, to support neighboring 
nations’ capacities to fight corruption, organized crime, inter-communal intolerance and tribal 
fragmentation.  
 
The ENP is an instrument, designed to develop European policies for support and 
assistance of neighboring nations outside the institutional process of accession negotiations. 
European institutions have had three levels of influencing reformist policies and 
transformation after 1989. The first level represents the threshold of Council of Europe 
membership.  General criteria for representative government and human rights respect apply 
here, and the accession is relatively easy.12 The second level applies to the process of 
association with the EU.13 Even if associate membership opens clear perspective for future 
full accession whenever the country is prepared, the influence of the EU over the domestic 
developments of the associate member remains largely consultative and general. It is only the 
third level of negotiations for full membership accession, which provides Brussels with 
explicit instruments to influence, press and claim the adequate reforms and transformation 
from the candidate country in order to fully comply with the criteria of the acquis 
communautaire.  
 
The principle task in front of the ENP is to develop powerful instruments of influence 
and cooperation with neighboring countries, in order to successfully assist on bilateral basis 
their strategies for development and modernization. Of course, this principle task applies only 
to nations which wish to develop and modernize in the European way. It’s inapplicable – no 
doubt – to nations and regimes that have chosen other tracks for development. If we come 
back to the Black Sea context, it is very important to see the ENP strategy applied in relation 
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to the reformist post-Soviet countries of the region. The bilateral format of the ENP supports 
the requirement to address different issues in different regional and national environments – 
Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan. A successful cooperation within the ENP 
format could provide the neighboring countries with a substantive part of resources, technical 
assistance, market access and institutional support, which are granted at full scale to the 
accession countries and underdeveloped members of the EU. 
 
Apart from the ENP as a bilateral instrument of implementing EU strategy towards the 
new neighborhood, broader frameworks to integrate the neighboring countries to the 
European mainstream could also prove useful. A multilateral approach may contribute to 
the establishment of a commonwealth of countries – not necessarily all European by territorial 
location and culture identity – which share the values, principles and strategic aims of united 
Europe in the global world. Such European Commonwealth of Nations could develop as an 
outer – looser circle of European integration, complimentary to the EU itself. The EU could 
develop a space of friendly nations, surrounding the community of full member states through 
maintaining that kind of a loose multilateral framework of institutional partnership. Including 
the Black Sea region countries into the EU Commonwealth format could prove a powerful 
impetus to stabilization and reform success in the region. It will create a solid background for 
the longer term relationship between the EU and Russia. It will develop the strategic role of 
the EU as a legitimate player in the region, which Russia and Turkey tend to consider a realm 
of their natural hegemony. 
 
The efficiency of the EU strategy towards the Black Sea region as part of the New 
Neighborhood of Europe is subject to several major factors. First comes the factor of 
successful development of the European CSFP and synthesis of integrated policy positions 
among the member states. Substantial differences between “new” and “old” Europe, as well 
as between left and center-right political positions of Western Europeans towards Russia, 
towards the Atlantic partnership policies, the policies of energy security in Europe etc., will 
more or less directly affect the ability of the EU to participate with relevant authority in the 
power balances in the Black Sea region. Second, the EU policies towards the Black Sea 
require a more detailed assessment of European interests in the region, within the larger 
context of the general European economic, developmental and political strategy in the present 
world. The initiative of German Chancellor Ms. Angela Merkel to initiate a comprehensive 
Black Sea strategy project of Europe in the framework of the upcoming German presidency of 
the EU is very positive news in this perspective. Third, the efficiency of a EU Black Sea 
strategy is dependent upon the initiative and capacity of the member states directly bordering 
the region, primarily Bulgaria and Romania (members after January 1, 2007), to promote in 
Brussels a vision of the region’s problems, challenges and opportunities. 
 
Last, but not least, a successful strategy of Europe towards the Black Sea is dependent 
upon the capacity of Brussels and Washington to coordinate their visions and priorities for the 
region and its larger context. After 2002 few people believe in the likelihood to restore an 
integrated structure of interests of the Western Alliance. Nevertheless, identifying common 
causes and interests of the transatlantic partners remains crucial to defending the common 
security space and the stability of the West in a world of growing unpredictability and global 
transformation. The world of multi-polarity, which is shaping up in the post-Iraq global 
environment will push Europe and the US to recognize sooner the communality, rather than 
the diversity of interest between them. 
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II. THE STATUS QUO POWERS OF THE BLACK SEA   
 
Both major powers of the Black Sea – Russia and Turkey - tend to decisively oppose 
(each one of them in its own way) the penetration of security and development infrastructure 
of the West into the region, which has been – now for more than five centuries – the realm of 
their bilateral contest and power balance. One thing is beyond doubt – Russia and Turkey will 
continue to compete for influence and control over the smaller nations and ethnic 
communities around the Black Sea shore. It is an issue of their common vital interest, 
however, to prevent outer players to intervene into their bilateral equation of power in the 
region. Both countries share elements of common strategy to prevent – and push out - 
Western military, naval and political interference into the Black Sea. Both countries develop 
intense strategy for mutual economic and political cooperation.14 Yet, each one of them 
develops specific strategic approach of defending - and extending its own grip over the realm 
of the Black Sea. Russia is a former superpower, reduced to a secondary role in global politics 
after 1991, but harboring strong ambitions to return to the first line of world powers. We’ve 
seen the start of those ambitions’ implementation in the last year, when a concentrated energy 
policy, in a combination with strong diplomatic efforts to build anti-Western alliances, has 
brought Russia to the fore of world politics in the context of US sinking in Iraq and in the Iran 
nuclear dispute.  
 
Turkey is a key member of the Atlantic Alliance, performing a viable role in the 
South-Eastern tier of the Western strategic realm. Yet, Ankara is strongly alienating itself 
from the US strategy to deal with the agenda of the Middle East and the war on terror. Turkey 
refuses to cooperate with the US in extending international military and naval control over the 
Black Sea, claiming to save its naval monopoly and privilege based on the 1936 Montreux 
Convention. A combination of revived Big Power revisionist appetites and deep frustration, 
caused by the controversial treatment of Turkey by the West (by the US in the Iraq war and 
by the EU in Turkey’s accession controversies) pushes Turkey into a strategic game of its 
own, including the agenda of the Black Sea. 
 
 
1. Russia and the Black Sea 
 
Reduced to the scope of the Black Sea region, Russia’s global strategic framework is 
reflected into two basic strategic dimensions: passive dimension of resistance, and active 
dimension of powerful geopolitical return through the policies of energy. The passive 
dimension of Russia’s Black Sea strategy concerns the policies of preserving as much as 
possible of the status quo, inherited from the Cold War period. With the accession of Bulgaria 
and Romania into NATO the territorial status quo of Soviet times could not be maintained 
anymore. The presence of the Western Alliance at the shores of the Black Sea has become a 
matter of fact. Reducing this fact to the least possible strategic value is the core purpose of 
Russian policies in the region. Provided that the Black Sea has the value of a strategic 
corridor, connecting Europe to the Caucasus, to the Caspian and to Central Asia, the most 
important thing is to cork, to plug up this corridor, to turn it into a dead end, an impasse for 
the Western security and developmental infrastructure. Jeopardizing politically Ukraine’s and 
Georgia’s application for NATO membership is one possible instrument to pursue this aim. 
Causing and maintaining low intensity conflicts in the “bottlenecks” of the Black Sea region – 
like the South Caucasus - is another instrument, used by Russia. The ethno-communal 
contests effectively fragment the fragile national structures of post-Soviet republics, putting 
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into jeopardy the key prerequisite for those countries to join the Western Alliance – 
institutional stability, transparency and rule of law.  
 
Understanding Russia’s strategy towards the Black Sea requires assimilating two 
formal paradoxes of Kremlin’s power. First, for a society like post-Soviet Russia, shaken by 
deep crises of identity, economy, demography and welfare, to focus on domestic reform and 
revival seems to be the only natural and reasonable approach – in particular after president 
Putin’s program to rebuild Russia was put into action. Paradoxically enough, post-Soviet 
Russia has spent a very sizable share of its efforts to empower and sustain marionette type of   
oppressive splinter regimes around the ex-Soviet periphery. Only in Georgia Moscow 
installed and supported the separatist regimes in Adjara15, Abkhazia and South Osetia, headed 
by local thugs and/or KGB officers. In Moldova, Russia backs the neo-communist junta of 
Transdniestria region. The Lukashenka regime in Belarus also enjoys substantial Russian 
support. Intervening in the elections of Ukraine was part of the same phenomenon of post-
Soviet Russia being overwhelmed by developments in the “near abroad” rather than by 
pending domestic challenges like poverty, demography and health care, organized crime and 
institutional inefficiency (to enlist just a few).   
 
Secondly, in international terms post-Soviet Russia is pressed by two powerful 
phenomena, most likely to shape the long-term fortunes of the country to survive and develop 
as a sizable international factor.16 These are the expansion of radical Islam from the South and 
the growth of China into a superpower of the 21st century in the East. The demographic 
expansion of the Muslim community of Russia, together with growing Islamist penetration 
into the southern periphery of the country, supporting separatism, terrorism and destruction of 
governmental control, are problems of irresoluble nature for the Russian government of today 
and in the observable future. The growth of a 1.3 billon strong China on the edge of scarcely 
populated Siberia may prove even bigger danger than Islam for Russia’s independence and 
territorial integrity in a perspective of the next few decades. Paradoxically enough, official 
statements and doctrines of the last decade in Moscow focus primarily on the danger of … 
NATO enlargement in CEE and “the ambitions of the West” … to “decompose Russia” and, 
allegedly – “conquer” it. What is the logic of ignoring the obvious long-term challenges to 
Russian security in favor of underlying “the threat”, coming out of NATO membership for the 
Baltic republics, Poland or of independent Georgia for Russian security and wellbeing?   
 
Exporting domestic pressure into conquest abroad is possibly the most fundamental 
principle of imperial policy in human history, Russian imperial history included. Today, like 
in many other circumstances in the past, the Kremlin team feels sizable shortage of 
opportunities to cope with the enormous scope of domestic problems within such a gigantic 
territorial proximity and communal diversity. Success in outward expansion is the cheapest 
available instrument to achieve domestic consolidation and self-confidence. This is how small 
operations to split and integrate negligible (in the context of huge Russian landmass) parts of 
neighboring Georgia and Moldova become irresistible to the Kremlin. The bad news for all 
other small neighbors is the necessity of Moscow to apply the same instrument further in time 
in order to maintain domestic pride and integrity intact. This is how the NATO enlargement 
becomes a threat, and peaceful, soft Euro-Atlantic periphery of CEE becomes a favorite target 
for Russia’s ambition for a successful geopolitical return on the global stage. 
 
Adverse policies towards Russia’s neighborhood serve also another important reason, 
apart from exporting domestic pressure in the “near abroad”,. All serious politicians and 
experts in Moscow understand perfectly well the unavoidable logic of aligning Russia with 
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the West in order to meet the geopolitical challenges of 21st century. There’s no community 
of long-term interest neither between Russia and the world of Islam, nor with China as 
superpower. The dilemma of Russia is not whether to align with the West. The dilemma is 
what price should the West pay for aligning with Russia, what is the price of the Russian 
bride in the family of the allied West? If Ukraine becomes an independent and democratic 
country – member of the NATO and the EU, if the South Caucasus and Central Asia evolve 
into open and easy accessible trade routes and strategically accessible territories to the West, 
Russia could be reduced to a sizable and important, yet ordinary member of the Western 
Alliance. If Ukraine is kept under the auspices of the Kremlin, if the South Caucasus is 
blocked by numerous and endless ethno-tribal contests, if Central Asia is kept under the 
despotism of local, friendly to Moscow personal feudal regimes, and Eastern Europe is 
cyclically shaken under the threat of energy blockade – then the price of Moscow as partner 
and ally is jumping high. Whether this assumption is truthful to the power holders in 
Washington or Brussels is not of key importance. The fact that matters is that it is truthful and 
reliable for the power holders in Moscow. Empire sells best.  
 
An important psychological – cultural factor of identity and political value system of 
Russian elites is additionally supportive to the strategy of passive resistance of Moscow 
towards its long-term partners in the West, while aligning with Russia’s most dangerous rivals 
in the East and in the South (namely – China and Iran). This factor could be defined as   
“authoritarian temptation”.17 Deep in their minds, the post-Soviet leaders harbor strong 
anxiety towards the West (the Cold War defeat is only one reason for it). This is combined 
with slightly hidden contempt and disgust at Western democracy with its restrictive checks 
and balances of power. The liberalization of the 1990s, designed after Western democracy is 
blamed for the blows on Russia’s statehood. Chinese and Islamist despotism is much closer 
and understandable for the current post-Soviet elite, originating mostly from the hierarchy of 
the KGB. “Authoritarians from all countries – unite”, could be the intimate logo of this deep 
affinity between Beijing, Teheran and Moscow, behind the official purpose of their alliance – 
to promote a multi-polar world order. 
 
The fragmentation through low intensity conflicts of regions like the South Caucasus 
also serves as a legitimization tool for Russia’s military forces to stay in key zones of 
geopolitical importance to Moscow, officially involved in peace keeping on the dividing lines 
between clashing communities. Russia’s military presence in such areas does not necessarily 
serve only as a barrier to Western interference – it may well guard old geopolitical frontiers 
like the one with the Ottoman Empire (and later – with the Turkish Republic), cutting through 
the border between Turkey and Armenia. From the perspective of international law it is 
difficult to explain the multiple roles, which Russia plays in conflicts like those in Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia, where Russian military have initiated and organized the conflicts, support 
separatist authorities against the legitimate Georgian government, and perform “peace 
keeping operations” between Georgian and separatist forces, while Kremlin diplomacy often 
“mediates” between the “conflicting parties”. 
 
Another instrument for Russia to sustain the regional status quo and to prevent further 
Western interference is the support Moscow provides for Turkey’s firm commitment to 
safeguard the clauses of the Montreux Convention for admitting foreign naval forces for a 
period, not larger than 21 days.18 Both Turkey and Russia insist on the Black Sea Force and 
Black Sea Harmony formats of naval cooperation among the littoral countries, refusing to 
admit other NATO members’ vessels into the Black Sea aquatory.  
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Russia is also aligned with Turkey in supporting the BSEC as the single legitimate 
multilateral format of Black Sea economic and political cooperation. Apart from neighboring 
non-littoral countries like Greece, Serbia and Azerbaijan, major countries of Europe and the 
US have access to the BSEC infrastructure only in consultative – observers’ status. Without 
providing too big benefits to its members in the last 15 years, because of its loose structure 
and bureaucratic inflexibility, the BSEC has practically maintained so far the Russian – 
Turkish hegemony in the lethargic regional debate for economic and political cooperation 
around the Black Sea.19 
 
The active dimension of Russia’s policy for geopolitical control over the Black Sea is 
focused on using energy flows and exports for strategic political purposes. Since the early 
1990s, gas, and to a lesser extent – oil exports, have been the key resource for economic 
survival and geopolitical influence of post-Soviet Russia.20 “Gasprom” has been the only 
system, functioning on the entire gigantic territory of Russia at the time when the great 
country has started to split into regions on economic and institutional-administrative grounds. 
Historically, the key principle of Russia’s statehood has always been ironclad centralization 
and in the period after Yeltzin, “Gasprom” has played its part in restoring central government 
control over Russia. “Gazprom” is vested with a similar role in the foreign policy domain, 
being the main instrument of Russia’s outward expansion. There, the key principle of Russia’s 
energy exports and trade is monopolization, direct full dependence and reliance upon 
Moscow for energy.  
 
In the 1990s “Gasprom” strongly attempted to buy and concentrate control over the 
entire gas pipelines infrastructure on the territory of ex-Soviet CEE satellites and the ex-
Soviet republics, in order to establish monopoly in decision making on gas supplies and gas 
transit through the region to outer Europe. Governments have been shaken and removed from 
power for declining Moscow’s offers to give up gas pipelines. The refusal of Bulgaria and 
Romania to sell the gas pipelines infrastructure to “Gasprom” has led to the construction of 
the “Blue Stream” pipeline at the bottom of the Black Sea, connecting Russian and Turkish 
territory.21 The exports of Russian oil followed the same logic (yet with less successful results 
than with gas) of closing technological and property cycle in a system of full monopoly of 
Russian companies, with the purchase of oil refineries, gas stations’ networks and removal of 
alternative – Middle Eastern – sources of crude oil and gas supplies. Russia struggled hard, 
yet with no success, to jeopardize the alternative routes for Caspian oil exports to the West – 
the BTC pipeline represents the first independent from Moscow route for mineral fuels’ 
exports from former Soviet territory westwards.  
 
With the significant authoritarian centralization swing of the second Putin 
government, the ambitions of Russia to utilize energy exports for significant geo-strategic 
purposes have grown immensely. In late 2005, using the favorable environment of US 
government immersed and hypnotized with Iraq and the war on terror, Mr. Putin’s team 
performed a vast scale brilliant operation of powerful geopolitical return of Russia on the 
global scene. The operation included the following elements: First, agreement with the 
German Chancellor for constructing the Baltic gas pipeline shortcut between Russian and 
German soil, bypassing Poland, Ukraine and the Baltic republics and their gas transfer 
infrastructure. This shortcut is the northern correlate of the Black Sea “Blue Stream” project. 
Second, urgent and unexpected claims for “world market” gas prices, made by “Gasprom” to 
Ukraine, Georgia and all other CIS countries. The political turmoil was unexpected and very 
painful and destabilizing for all pro-Western governments in the region. Third, Moscow 
negotiated agreements with Turkmenistan, Iran and Algeria for full-scale cartelization of the 
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European gas market.22 Fourth, series of “special agreements” are pursued by Moscow for 
doubling the gas transfer infrastructure under the “Gasprom” control.23 The basic purpose of 
such doubling is to concentrate all possible routes for energy (gas in particular) diversification 
in Russian hands, and – in this way – to jeopardize the very opportunity for diverse and 
balanced energy flows into Europe. Fifth, large scale projects of Russian investment and 
development of the energy systems of many European countries have been undertaken in 
order to further reduce sources of energy flows out of Russian control on European soil. The 
growing prices of oil, reflected in the rapid growth of Russia’s GDP figures have supported 
those investment projects’ implementation.24  
 
The results of the Kremlin energy monopolization plan have been more or less 
spectacular, in particular in Europe, where all talks of energy diversification leave an explicit 
taste of impotence and discord. A country with the GDP of the Netherlands – as Russia was in 
2004 – has managed to implement a strategy of subordinating the entire Old Continent to its 
interest through establishing a practical monopoly of energy flows – in particular in CEE. In 
the realm of the Black Sea the effects of Russia’s energy monopoly will be even more direct 
and immediate – both in terms of economic balances and cooperation, and in terms of 
geopolitical – strategic impact. The collapse of the Orange coalition of Ukraine and the 
establishment of an Orange – Blue government, the successful jeopardizing of NATO’s 
“Active Endeavor” transfer to the Black Sea, the stagnation in the Euro-Atlantic Black Sea 
strategy are the first indicators for a changing strategic balance in favor of Russia and the 
status quo powers of the region in general.  
 
It is highly uncertain for how long Russia’s successful geopolitical return on the 
energy monopoly ticket could hold. Prices of oil will most likely continue to rise for the 
observable future. Europe will continue to be directly dependent at disproportionate levels on 
Russian energy flows. The US strategic involvement in hot spots outside Europe and the 
Black Sea will obviously deepen, which could further slow down the Atlantic Black Sea 
strategy dynamics. After partially regaining positions in the post-Soviet periphery, Russia 
may also try to extend its strategic influence in the “soft belly” of Europe – the Balkans, 
where controversial post-conflict settlement fails to achieve significant results. Yet the 
longevity of Russian strategic success, based on energy monopoly is uncertain. First, there are 
few – if any indicators of successful re-investing of the abundant oil money into the Russian 
economy and infrastructure development. High-tech elites and modern technological 
development occupy marginal positions in Russia of today. There is an obvious absence of 
administrative infrastructure, of market and political mechanisms to address the pending 
issues and challenges of demography, welfare, health care and education. The governing team 
in the Kremlin commands high level of skills for strategic planning and operational abilities, 
but highly insufficient resources to influence societal, economic and human development. 
That makes it difficult for Russia to invest in a long-term strategic success.  
 
 
2. Turkey and the Black Sea 
 
 It is really interesting to elaborate on the logic of Turkey’s transformation from a most 
devoted Euro-Atlantic partner in the Cold War to a status quo power in the Black Sea region. 
Turkey has a complex legacy of relationships with Russia. The Ottoman Empire was the key 
rival and obstacle to Russia’s imperial strategy to conquer the Straits and reach the shores of 
the “warm seas” southwards. Both empires fought for every inch of Black Sea littoral territory 
and for control over both regions of strategic importance in the Russian-Ottoman contest – the 
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Balkans and the Caucasus. After the Bolshevik revolution – and with the establishment of the 
Turkish republican government - the Soviet regime proved the most ardent supporter of 
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and his republican project. Significant ideological, political and 
organizational influence of Lenin’s Bolsheviks contributed to the constituting of independent 
Turkish Republic.  
 
 In the Cold War era Turkey was completely absorbed into the strategic agenda of the 
Atlantic community for one simple reason – Soviet power has “sandwiched” the country from 
north and south – through involving Syria and other parts of the Middle East into its strategic 
realm of influence. In this way the Kremlin pushed Ankara into closer cooperation with the 
West as a collective guardian of Turkey’s independence. The modern pro-European – pro-
Western ideology of Kemalism has additionally supported Ankara’s integration into the 
Atlantic Alliance.  
 
 The collapse of Soviet communism has coincided with the end of the “golden decade” 
of Turkey’s economic and political development. Emerging from the military coup of 1980, 
the government of Turgut Ozal has managed to gradually transform the ideological and the 
economic legacy of Turkey. The etatiste economic system gave way to the orthodoxy of 
fashionable neo-liberalism, and the Kemalist political – ideological integrity has been 
cautiously, yet insistently loosened and diversified. Together with its staunch secularism, 
Kemalism adopted non-interventionist doctrine of neighborhood and foreign policy – “Peace 
in Turkey – Peace in the World”. Ozal insistently injected into Turkish political visions 
growing portions of reconciliation with the country’s Islamic legacy, and sincere pride of the 
Ottoman past as a superb expression of “Turkishness”. The new economic and political might 
of the country boosted pan-Turkish sentiments and ambitions at the very moment when the 
Soviet superpower collapsed – with a number of republics with Turkic population emerging 
formally independent out of Soviet rule.25 
 
Turkey initiated two major projects to reflect its new might and regional importance – 
one designed to integrate the post-Soviet Turkic republics to the pan-Turkish visions of 
Ankara (Turks live “from the Adriatic to the Great China Wall”), and a second one designed 
to install Turkey as the major power of the Black Sea. The institutional framework for the 
second project was developed through the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) 
initiative. It has become clear in the first half of the 1990s that the Caucasus and Central Asia 
Turkic communities could not be integrated into a Great Turkish political project. Series of 
cultural, economic and important political – strategic factors prevented easy success of 
Ankara in turning its pan-Turkish sentiments into geopolitical power and supremacy. The 
resources of Turkey itself proved smaller than needed to cope with such an ambitious task, 
and the rumors of total collapse of Russia together with communism proved vastly 
exaggerated. Instead of enjoying new imperial fortunes in Asia and the Caucasus, Ankara had 
to urgently cope with the PKK rebellion on its own soil. 
 
Turkey enjoyed better results in the Black Sea dimension.26 The BSEC did not serve 
as an appropriate instrument to extending Turkish economic and political interests in the field 
of regional cooperation. The economic destruction and the institutional disintegration of most 
post-communist countries in the region produced weak governments, impotent to stand the 
obligations, accepted by them in the multilateral format of the BSEC. Turkish endeavor with 
the BSEC proved successful in a longer term in two basic ways. First, it has created a 
regional format of economic and political partnership, where Turkey enjoys the position of a 
“superpower”. Second, the other superpower of the region – Russia, was unexpectedly 
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strongly attracted by the BSEC format. Both historical rivals – Russia and Turkey – have 
found an institutional design of cooperatively sharing their bilateral hegemony over the Black 
Sea region. The BSEC did not matter much for the smaller countries of the region. Yet it 
delivered a lot in boosting economic, commercial and political cooperation between Moscow 
and Ankara, raising step by step the level of confidence between them. Step by step, year by 
year, economic partnership and political cooperation would lead to a community of strategic 
interest, to a deeper and longer term affinity between both countries’ visions for the region 
and for the world. 
 
Throughout the 1990s, Turkey remained a staunch ally in the Atlantic community, 
maintaining traditional special relationships with the US on the basis of its viable position as a 
bridgehead of the West in the Middle East. Turkey’s alienation from its major partner in the 
West started in early 2000s, with two major transformations in America’s global strategy. The 
first of them relates directly to the 9/11 events and the American strategy for war on terror. 
The complex restructuring of the Middle East as the backbone of President Bush’s 
administration strategy for war on terror affected directly Turkey’s vision and practices of 
national security. The war in Iraq provided growing autonomy to the Kurds in the North – 
with all possible repercussions on Turkey’s internal war with the PKK and the Turkey’s 
Kurdish question in general. Turkey’s commercial routes with the Arabic world were 
complicated or terminated. The new outburst of anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism in the 
Islamic world has put Turkey as an Atlantic partner – particularly governed by the Islamist 
AK Party – into dire straits of relationships with the Islamic world. The nuclear crisis with 
Iran – if it enters a hot phase, could additionally compromise Turkish national security – both 
in re-shaking again the Kurdish issue and in putting Ankara into the frontline between its 
major Atlantic partner and the Islamic world, to which Turkey belongs.  
 
The second transformation of global Atlantic strategy refers to the growing 
importance of the Black Sea after a decade of integrating CEE countries as full members of 
NATO. Turkey supported NATO enlargement “from Talin to Bourgas”, but now it is hesitant 
to see the Black Sea realm fully integrated into the Euro-Atlantic mainstream. Turkish 
national doctrine – much as the Russian one - harbors traditional nationalist–imperial 
worldview of the 19th century. The world is composed of bigger Powers, with their spheres of 
hegemony and control over smaller powers, and a system of balancing among the Powers of 
the day produces a viable international system. For Ankara (and for Moscow either) the Black 
Sea is a Turkish-Russian lake. America and Europe are welcome to care about the strategic 
identity of the Black Sea – but only through partnership and mediation of the hegemonic 
powers of the region. The West has Turkey as ally – why does America need to intervene in 
the region itself? There are two possible answers – mistrust or arrogance - both very offensive 
for the proud Turks… This type of logic is explicitly manifested in Turkish inexorability to 
compromise with the Montreux Convention regulations and to let foreign - be it NATO allied 
- naval vessels for more than 21 days (as Article 18/2 of the Convention states).27 The official 
Turkish position on the “Active Endeavor” operation of NATO to be extended from the 
Mediterranean to the Black Sea is negative, based on the argument that other littoral countries 
– that is the Russian Federation – will resist it.28 Following this logic, littoral – “inner” powers 
have supremacy over NATO allies. Collective security – as meant by the strategic doctrines of 
Europe and the US - is a concept, recognized by Ankara only to the extent and in cases, in 
which Turkey benefits: as for example in the collective – consensual decision making in 
NATO on issues out of key Turkish national and security interest. Once the inner circle of 
Turkish regional – territorial and national security interests are affected (as in the case of 
Black Sea naval regime), collective decision making paradigm is being decisively 
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transformed into a Great Powers’ 19th century “European Concert” mentality – “mine is mine, 
yours is common” approach. 
 
Turkey’s role and interest in the Black Sea will be significantly transformed with the 
country’s accession into the EU. No one is certain when and for what period of time Turkish 
membership will become fait accompli, yet the key effects of Turkey being granted, or being 
denied membership, are relatively clear. Ankara has to fight for membership mostly on the 
grounds of its political adaptation to the norms and rules of the EU. Some basic obstacles in 
this context could be mentioned. First, the EU is a community of post-national – post-
nationalist character, which does not welcome particularly ethnic nationalism and inter-
communal conflicts, caused by oppression of ethnic minorities’ rights. Turkey is a community 
of state and society, enthusiastically devoted to strong nationalist identity and nationalist 
pride, where any claim for ethnic or religious autonomy is generally considered as treason. 
Second, the nationalist doctrine of Turkey causes irresoluble conflicts with ethnocentric 
movements – as the one of the Kurds, claiming cultural and communal autonomy, long ago 
granted by all major European countries to their minorities. This doctrine has also led Turkey 
into an impasse on the issue of the Armenian slaughters in the early 20th century as the 
Turkish state does not recognize the killing of more than a million of Armenians in the late 
Ottoman Empire as genocide. Third, Turkish political identity is hard to adapt to EU 
standards because of both the practices of official secularism and political Islam. Secular 
character of the Turkish state is still guaranteed by the National Security Council, controlled 
by the army, and political Islam in government still tends to produce precedents, unacceptable 
for EU political rules – like the dispute for the criminal character of adultery.29 Last, but not 
least, the issue of Cyprus seems to be an indelible division line between Ankara and Brussels. 
 
If Turkey proves successful to implement necessary political reforms (or if Brussels at 
some point of negotiations decides to silently accept the status quo, wrapped in nominal 
adoption of the acquis by Ankara), the EU membership will definitely be granted. Turkey’s 
membership will make dramatic difference in the Black Sea region. First, the EU accession 
will fully legitimize Turkey as a regional power on the Balkans in economic, demographic 
and political terms. There is no country in the region – neither a community of countries, 
which could balance the potential of Turkey in economic and demographic terms. The role, 
which Turkey insistently assigns for itself – as patron of all Turkish and Muslim minorities of 
the Balkan countries, and even in wider Europe30 - will definitely provide Ankara with the 
resources to support and arbiter inter-communal disputes of the Balkan countries in favor of 
its regional superpower status31. Second, as member of the EU Turkey will hold particular 
responsibility to initiate – and direct – the policies of united Europe towards its eastern and 
southern neighborhood. That will install Turkey as a powerful factor of influence (much more 
powerful than today) towards the Caucasus region and the Middle East. Third, EU 
membership will further extend Turkey’s autonomy from the US and will reopen the contest 
for regional hegemony with Russia. It is questionable, however, whether the EU will be 
capable to function at the present level of institutional and political integration with a 
powerful member with uncompromising nationalist agenda as Turkey is. Some of the answers 
to this question will be provided in the next decade to come. 
 
 If Turkey is put on a very slow track towards EU membership, or is practically denied 
accession, the pressures to change the country’s political identity will mount up. For the first 
time in modern history, we encounter a strong view of Eurasian identity of Turkey, shared by 
influential circles in Ankara. Eurasian ideology is part of this growing affinity between 
Turkey and Russia in the post-Cold War period, which signifies a widening scope of common 
 18
concerns, opportunities and interests. Both Moscow and Ankara are suspicious and mistrustful 
towards Europe’s postmodern exercises in multiculturalism, decentralization of state power, 
liberal culture of growing diversity and pacifist–constructivist methodologies of 
interdependence as a background for security. Empire and traditional authoritarian 
nationalism sell much better on the Turkish-Russian political markets, pushing both countries 
closest to each other in their long history of relationships. If this growing affinity is 
transformed in a more established union of interest, we’ll have to face a Black Sea region, 
dominated by Russian-Turkish interest, where Europe and the US will have to negotiate their 
strategies from an unprivileged position, or to confront the Russian-Turkish hegemony and 
status quo.32 The smaller littoral countries of the Black Sea will either be absorbed into the 
Russian-Turkish axes as satellites, or will have to adopt an uneasy position of representing the 
frontiers of the West vis-à-vis the powerful bilateral hegemony in the region. 
 
 
 
III. THE COMMUNITY OF HOPEFUL:  THE POST-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES OF THE 
BLACK SEA REGION 
 
Apart from Russia and Turkey, the other countries of the Black Sea region share 
several common features and community of interests. First, they all represent post-communist 
societies, and with the exception of Bulgaria and Romania, all they are post-Soviet republics. 
Nation-building, modernization, institutional transformation, democratic and market reform 
are their common agenda for the present and – for most of them – for the observable future. 
Second, all those countries have been part of one or of both major empires of the region – the 
Russian and the Ottoman - in large periods of their history, or throughout their history. Their 
national identity has been constituted through numerous battles for emancipation and 
independence. Third, most, if not all, of those countries (or at least large sections of their 
elites and general populace) desire and apply for membership in the institutions of security 
and development of the West – the NATO and the EU. It is essential for them to involve the 
West in the equation of their security and development as the key prerequisite to exit the 
vicious circle of repeating imperial dependencies of the past in their future. Therefore, all 
those countries represent a group of natural allies of the Western strategy to transform and 
integrate the Black Sea region into the Euro-Atlantic mainstream. 
 
The communality of interest among the Black Sea post-communist nations is rather 
potential than effective at present. Unlike the Mediterranean, the Black Sea has not 
represented an integral region historically – neither in cultural, nor in economic – commercial 
and political terms. Both major sub-regions along the Black Sea cost – the Balkans and the 
Caucasus – do share similar agendas of development in history, but have always been parallel 
realities, with few if any precedents of interdependence or mutual influence. Ukraine has been 
an integral part of Russia and the USSR, and makes its first steps of independent existence 
after 1991. Geographic location and post-Soviet legacy also matter a lot in defining diversity 
among the Black Sea countries. Bulgaria and Romania, for being situated on the western flank 
of the region, were faster embraced by the integration process into the NATO and the EU. 
They have been part of the Soviet block, but not of the Soviet Union, which made their post-
communist legacy easier to cope with and to overcome (even if their process of 
transformation is not over yet).  
 
The countries of the South Caucasus pass through a painful process of nation-building 
and establishment of integral nation states, facing a broad variety of hostile factors and 
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obstacles in the process. Some of those obstacles spring from the relative weakness, or even 
absence of modern tradition of societal development, which makes it difficult to overcome 
tribal identities and conflicts, economic backwardness and political fragmentation and 
instability within the post-Soviet transitional environment. Additional barriers to development 
and reconciliation have been raised within a complicated environment of regional conflicts 
and disputes between major nations and communities of the region – Armenians and Azeris 
for example. Interference of Russia in the region, considered by Moscow to be a natural 
sphere of its interest, has led to several major conflicts, particularly on the territory of 
Georgia. These conflicts cannot be resolved without the goodwill of the Kremlin, or in a 
broader international framework of restoring the rules of international law towards cases like 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The same applies to Transdniestria in Moldova, even if is far 
from the Caucasus. It is also important, in this context, to bring Turkey and Armenia to a 
reconciliatory process, which could lead to lifting the Turkish blockade on Armenia and to 
opening the Turkish – Armenian border. 
 
Ukraine is a specific case of a post-Soviet country, searching for its identity and 
internal communal and cultural balance through a complex process of nation-building and 
political transformation. Countries like Ukraine, which share double identity, could serve both 
as bridges or frontlines between major civilizations or geopolitical divides. The controversial 
development of the Orange revolution is a case in point. It will take time for Ukrainian people 
to decide about their desired future, and it is important for Europe, the US and Russia to 
create and maintain decent environment for Ukraine’s efforts to constitute itself as an 
independent and successful nation. Ukraine, for its size, location, economic and societal 
potential is a key partner in the Black Sea cooperation process. Most regional initiatives for 
democratic partnership – GUAM, the CDC, and the Black Sea Forum – could not be 
successful without the full value participation of Ukraine.  
 
We can observe a mosaic picture of attitudes and policies among the post-Soviet – 
post-communist countries of the Black Sea region, towards Euro-Atlantic and EU integration 
processes. For Georgia NATO membership represents the vital precondition to stand for the   
country’s independence and territorial integrity provided the adverse policies of Russia 
towards Tbilisi.33 For Armenia, stuck into the long-term conflict with Azerbaijan on the 
Nagorno-Karabakh issue, partnership with Russia and Russian military presence represent a 
key factor to sustain territorial benefits and to guarantee independence for the Karabakh 
Armenians. Iran, on the other hand, is a valuable partner of Yerevan – in particular for energy 
supplies and for providing export markets to the small republic in blockade. This double 
dependence of Armenia on Russia and Iran does not presume public enthusiasm on behalf of 
Yerevan to join NATO, yet Armenian government has shown enough pragmatic interest in 
NATO’s partnership programs like IPAP. Armenians – both in the country and of Diaspora 
generally view their country’s future within the European – Euro-Atlantic context. 
 
Azerbaijan is also hesitant to openly apply for integration into the Euro-Atlantic 
mainstream for a number of important reasons and concerns. The country is in complicated 
relationships with Russia for both the Karabakh issue, and – more importantly – for the 
policies of energy exports. Moscow has kept Azeri oil sealed within the single export route 
through Russian territory until the BTC pipeline has opened the alternative route to the cost of 
the Mediterranean. Azerbaijan also faces complicated agenda of relationships with Iran, 
where Azeri minority represents a bigger community than the Azeri’s living in independent 
Azerbaijan. Maintaining a system of authoritarian rule (power has been transferred from 
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father to son Alievs and electoral procedures have been quite brutally violated) does not bring 
Azerbaijan closer to Atlantic partnership either. 
 
For all post-Soviet republics EU membership is desired, yet unattainable goal for the 
foreseeable future. The EU enlargement capacity, the complexity of relationships between 
Russia and the EU, the complicated agenda of inter-communal conflicts and controversial 
political reforms are obstacles hard to surmount. The unbinding of the package NATO – EU 
membership, which served as a powerful stimulus to democratic reforms in CEE, does not 
support reformist incentives in the post-Soviet space either. It is in Europe’s interest and EU 
responsibility to develop its neighborhood policies in a format, which could support the 
longer term strategy for full integration of post-Soviet periphery into the European 
mainstream.34  
 
Bulgaria and Romania, having almost completed the efforts for their double 
accession to the institutions of the West – NATO and the EU – have the responsibility to 
initiate and promote policies of efficient integration of the Black Sea countries into the 
European and the Atlantic community. Both countries represent the frontier of the West to the 
Black Sea and it is in their direct interest to extend those frontiers further to the East. Sofia 
and Bucharest follow considerably different policies in the Black Sea context in the last years, 
dependent on their specific legacy and present policy agenda. Lately Bucharest has been more 
active than Sofia in the Black Sea regional policies. Romanians’ perception of selves as 
“Latin bridgehead” into a “Sea of Slavs” brings them to more explicit pro-Atlantic and anti-
Russian standing in assessing the Black Sea agenda. Bucharest has also the ambition to lead 
Black Sea cooperation process from the positions of the Atlantic community, which causes 
wrathful reactions both in Moscow and Ankara. Bulgaria, with its historic affinity towards 
Russia, and with its sizable Turkish minority, over-represented in Bulgarian government – has 
a narrower space to initiate pro-Western Black Sea policies. Yet all official documents and 
positions of consecutive Bulgarian governments confirm the country’s interest and 
responsibility to the Black Sea region from the perspectives of its belonging to the institutions 
of the West. Both Sofia and Bucharest will have shortly after their EU accession to transform 
principle political standings into concrete policy proposals for common European Black Sea 
strategy.35 
 
With all the delicacy of their Black Sea policies versus the regional superpowers 
Russia and Turkey, both Bulgaria and Romania have supported – until the very last moment, 
the extension of NATO “Active Endeavor” operation from the Mediterranean to the Black 
Sea. Sofia and Bucharest did not get “Active Endeavor” into the Black Sea, but the success of 
Turkey – with Russian support – to keep the Black Sea as a closed lake for NATO 
cooperation raises an important question and principled debate. NATO countries – Bulgaria 
and Romania included – have chosen membership in the Alliance in order to enjoy the 
privilege of common security. What is the value of NATO membership for Sofia and 
Bucharest, if Turkey and Russia will keep for themselves the exclusive right to naval 
hegemony in the Black Sea?36  
 
With its entire mosaic diversity and particularity of interest, the policy agenda of 
Black Sea post-communist countries is concentrated and homogenized around one basic 
priority – to support and promote the strategies of integrating the Black Sea region into the 
mainstream of Euro-Atlantic security and development. It is only the Euro-Atlantic 
perspective, which could help the region to get rid of its legacy of imperial contest, communal 
fragmentation and autarchic isolation, reproduced for centuries by the Big Powers of the 
 21
Black Sea. The worst case scenario for the Black Sea region is a new status quo and strategic 
balance among major international factors – the US, Europe, Turkey and Russia – splitting the 
region into rival pieces and fractions. We all need to push geopolitical divides and rivalries – 
if they’re unavoidable – as much further to the East as possible. The best-case scenario for the 
Black Sea is the homogeneous geopolitical integration of the region to the West.  
 
 
 
IV. ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIC OPTIONS FOR BLACK SEA SECURITY AND 
DEVELOPMENT IN SHORT AND MIDTERM PERSPECTIVE 
 
The alternative options for implementing the Euro-Atlantic Black Sea strategy in the 
next 3-5 years should be considered within the classical scale of optimism, pessimism and 
realism from the perspective of likelihood to accomplish the following basic strategic tasks. 
First comes the NATO enlargement in the Black Sea region. To consider the enlargement 
task as being successfully accomplished would mean at least to have a clear road map and 
time schedule of NATO accession at least for Georgia, Ukraine and – possibly – Moldova at 
the summit of 2008. Georgia is the only country where the political prerequisites for 
membership – that is good will, institutional adjustment and security sector reform – might 
prove sufficiently accomplished for setting an accession timeline. With Mr. Yanukovich in 
office as prime minister of Ukraine, it is unlikely that Kiev would be willing or able to deliver 
seriously upon the NATO accession goal within the next 2-3 years. In Moldova we also have 
a combination of political determination to go on with democratic reforms with a 
controversial agenda of conflict management of Transdnistrian issue and institutional fragility 
hindering the security sector reform. The strong opposition and the concerted efforts of Russia 
to prevent further NATO enlargement in its “near abroad” further reduce the chances for fast 
track accession process within the post-Soviet Black Sea space. It is most likely that NATO is 
going to focus on an extended agenda of partnership programs and adaptation schemes 
anticipating more favorable political environment to accomplish an enlargement effort in the 
region.  
 
The second important strategic task of the Atlantic agenda is resolving the “frozen 
conflicts” issue. It is partly possible to improve the conflict situation and push ahead the 
resolution process as in the case with the Kodori Gorge37 in Abkhazia this summer, and with 
the settlement of Nagorno-Karabakh issue in a series of consecutive measures and partial 
goals accomplishment.38 It is not realistic, though, to seriously consider final settlement of the 
“frozen conflicts” issue without an agreement between Russia and the US about the general 
format of their strategic relationships, in the Black Sea region in particular. The “frozen 
conflicts” zones are hostages to Russia’s strategic gambling with the American superpower on 
the general framework of their bilateral relations. There could hardly be any substantial 
improvement of the “frozen conflicts” agenda before the issues of this framework are being 
sorted out. 
 
Third, after the successful attempt of Moscow to consolidate its energy exports 
strategy and impose practical monopoly of Russian gas supplies – in particular for Eastern 
Europe – the success of the Euro-Atlantic Black Sea strategy will also be measured by the 
degree of guaranteeing diversity of energy supplies for the region. The fragile agreements of 
Georgia with Azerbaijan and of Armenia with Iran for gas imports, bypassing “Gasprom” are 
far from achieving real diversity, let alone independence from Russian supplies. It is an 
extremely complicated mosaic of interest, involving Turkey, Iran, Kazakhstan, Europe and a 
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number of other governmental and corporate players, which determines the logic of growing 
energy dependency of Eastern Europe, and the Black Sea in particular, on Russia. The only 
realistic project for gas supply diversification – the Nabuco pipeline – is dependent upon 
Turkmen and Iranian gas. “Gasprom” is trying to counter Nabuco with a Russian – Hungarian 
project of re-exporting gas, supplied to Turkey through the “Blue Stream” via the territories of 
Bulgaria and Romania to Hungary, and to Western Europe. It will take longer period of time 
and resources consolidation, before a realistic strategy of energy diversification against 
Russia’s monopoly could take place. 
 
Fourth, in order to succeed in midterm perspective, the Euro-Atlantic strategy for the 
Black Sea needs to be elevated higher in the priority list of strategic goals of both Washington 
and Brussels. The EU will definitely focus on other priorities within the next decade, rather 
than the Black Sea development – and the reasons for that have already been clarified in 
Chapter I/2. Yet this state of affairs will not make a dramatic difference provided the low 
level of EU interest towards the region throughout the entire period after 1989.39 The slowing 
down of US involvement in the region will have deeper effects on the entire process of 
reformist transformation and the Black Sea strategy implementation. Being almost entirely 
consumed by the one-dimensional logic of the war on terror, it is more likely for Washington 
to take an informal break from the Black Sea issues and just play a rearguard game of 
preserving positions vis-à-vis Russia and Turkey. Time will let us see how successful that 
kind of game could be.  
 
Last but not least, a relative success of the Black Sea strategy could be achieved as a 
consequence of a more concerted Western action plan in the fields of security and 
development in the region. The departure of worldviews in Europe and in Washington in the 
context of the Iraq war signified a deeper process of gradual split in both parties’ security 
paradigms that had taken place with the end of the Cold War. As the US under the G. W. 
Bush administration returned straight back to traditional power (military power) politics of the 
19th and 20th century, Western Europeans turned to the other pole of constructivist – 
interdependency paradigm of security. It is probably time for reassessment on the both sides 
now, when it is obvious that the US is failing to achieve its initial goals in the Iraqi desert, and 
Europe can hardly report any success in “the interdependence” game with new and 
unconventional security challenges like radical Islam on European soil. Such reassessment 
could bring strategic views closer and in better harmony with the communality of long term 
interest of both sides of the Atlantic, representing both major parties of the West vis-à-vis a 
world of growing diversity and multi-polarity. 
 
Finally, and with all conditionality of the multi-factorial analysis of complex realities, 
we could forecast a period of relative slow down and rearrangement of elements within the 
Euro-Atlantic strategy for the Black Sea region. It will be difficult to keep the balance of 
power that was reached in the region until 2005 and it will be difficult to avoid the transfer of 
strategic initiative in the hands of competing powers. The broader strategic context of the 
present global world will soon require more fundamental decisions on further development – 
and regaining initiative - of the Black Sea strategy of the West.   
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